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Since the early 1990s, there has been a very large growth in mortgages made by so-called
subprime lenders, which specialize in lending to borrowers with credit history problems. One
reason for concern about this trend is that it has been associated with a large and simultaneous
rise in foreclosures, which can entail significant costs not just for those directly affected but also
for surroundingneighborhoodsand larger communities. This study uses multivariate estimations
to quantify the impact of subprime lending on neighborhood foreclosure levels. After controlling
for neighborhood demographics and economic conditions, the authors find that subprime loans
lead to foreclosures at far greater rates than do prime loans. Moreover, subprime lending appears
to account for a substantial share of foreclosure activity in high-foreclosure neighborhoods.
Keywords: mortgage lending; foreclosures; predatory lending; subprime lending; lending
discrimination
Since the early 1990s, there has been a very large growth in mortgage loans
made by firms called subprime lenders, which specialize in lending to bor-
rowers with credit history problems (U.S. Department of the Treasury and
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2000). Many fair lend-
ing advocates and policy makers have expressed concerns about this trend.
There have been at least three sources of concern. First, because the market
for home loans is significantly segmented by race, with minority neighbor-
hoods served excessively by subprime lenders, homeowners in minority
communities may be effectively steered toward higher-cost products (Calem,
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Gillen, and Wachter, forthcoming; Immergluck 2004; National Committee
Reinvestment Coalition [NCRC] 2003). If minority communities are targets
of higher-cost lenders and receive little attention from prime lenders, the
odds of minority borrowers with good credit histories receiving higher-cost
loans may be higher than that of White borrowers with good credit. A second
concern—and a key component of recent policy debates—has to do with the
rise in abusive or predatory practices that have been associated with the
subprime industry (U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development 2000). A third reason to be concerned
about the growth of subprime lending is that the sector has been associated
with a simultaneous rise in foreclosures. Moreover, the spatial concentration
of subprime lending appears to have led to concentrations of foreclosures in
minority and modest-income neighborhoods, which in turn can have nega-
tive effects on their stability and development prospects.
This article primarily focuses on the third concern. In particular, we seek
to measure the impact of subprime lending on neighborhood foreclosures.
Although other studies have presented simple, comparative change data to
suggest a link between subprime lending and foreclosures, to our knowledge
no multivariate studies have been published to date. We seek to inform the
policy debates on subprime and predatory lending by providing a better
quantitative sense of the impact of subprime loans on foreclosure levels. To
this point, much of the research receiving the most attention in predatory
lending policy debates has focused either on issues of whether subprime
loans are fairly priced and any associated steering between prime and
subprime products (Phillips-Patrick et al. 2000; Calem, Gillen, and Wachter,
forthcoming; Pennington-Cross, Yezer, and Nichols 2000), the extent of
predatory practices (Stein and Libby 2001; Stock 2001), or the effects of
antipredatory lending laws on credit availability (Quercia, Stegman, and
Davis 2003). The latter research in particular has focused on the degree to
which regulation might restrict access to credit, if at all, while generally not
taking into account the cost side of the status quo. Less research has been
helpful in quantifying the magnitude of the negative effects of subprime
lending, in its present state, on families and neighborhoods. To fully weigh
the benefits and costs of policy alternatives, more information is needed on
the cost side of an essentially deregulationist approach. One important aspect
of the costs of subprime lending is the impact on neighborhood foreclosure
levels.
Defaults and especially foreclosures can entail significant costs and hard-
ships not just for the families most directly affected but also for surrounding
neighborhoods and even for larger communities. McCarthy, VanZandt, and
Rohe (2000) describe how foreclosures can involve losing not only accumu-
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lated home equity and the costs associated with acquiring the home but also
access to stable, decent housing. Moreover, foreclosures can damage credit
ratings, hurting the owners’ prospects not only in credit markets but also in
labor and insurance markets and in the market for rental housing. Moreno
(1995) estimated average losses to a foreclosed family of $7,200. In addition
to the direct costs in dealing with abandoned properties and the public safety
costs associated with them, there are potential spillovers on the values of, and
tax receipts from, nearby properties. These spillover effects can be signifi-
cant. Simons, Quercia, and Maric (1998) estimated that average sales prices
fell $788 for each 1% increase in tax delinquencies within a one- to two-
block area of a residence. Cities, counties, and school districts lose tax reve-
nue from abandoned homes. In examining Federal Housing Administration
foreclosures, for example, Moreno (1995) estimated average city costs of
$27,000 and neighborhood costs of $10,000. Moreover, these figures do not
account for all of the social and psychic costs of foreclosures, either to the
family or the community.
THE GROWTH AND SPATIAL CONCENTRATION
OF SUBPRIME LENDING
The explanation for the growth and spatial concentration of subprime
lending involves the confluence and interaction of a number of economic and
social conditions and policy changes. One major structural factor in the
growth of subprime activity has been the increasingly specialized and seg-
mented nature of financial services markets. Financial institutions have
sought to market credit products more aggressively to consumer markets and
to maximize profits through price discrimination. Borrowers who are willing
to pay more, due perhaps to their inferior understanding of financial prod-
ucts, desperate financial situations, or other conditions, are identified and
offered higher costs and less advantageous products. Borrowers who are
expected to shop more for financial products and are actively courted by
mainstream financial institutions are offered lower prices and better terms.
This trend creates a cross-subsidization, where borrowers in financial diffi-
culty are generally targeted by higher-cost providers, and the strong profits in
those sectors may compensate the more competitively priced business of the
financial conglomerate.
The dual market in mortgage credit is also facilitated by a system of dual
consumer regulation. Banks and thrifts are subject to the Community Rein-
vestment Act, fair lending, and consumer compliance regulation imple-
mented by a cadre of thousands of bank examiners in four federal bank regu-
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latory agencies. But the finance companies that tend to dominate the sub-
prime market generally undergo no regular examinations by federal regula-
tors, and state regulators generally have much less capacity than their
federal counterparts. The Federal Trade Commission has some minimal
resources to address lenders, but the states are the principal source of regula-
tory oversight.
Another factor in the growth and concentration of subprime lending has
been the growth in the elderly population, including many relatively isolated
homeowners—especially in minority neighborhoods—who are generally
unfamiliar with mortgage products. Seniors in minority neighborhoods are
often especially isolated. Many older Blacks purchased their homes in an era
when financial institutions, especially banks, were not at all interested in
making loans to them. Elderly homeowners tend to have substantial equity in
their homes, making them ideal targets for lenders wishing to extract large
amounts of fees via “equity stripping” practices. In 1993, 78% of U.S. home-
owners ages sixty-five to seventy-five had no housing debt, and 90% of those
older than seventy-five had no mortgage debt (American Association of
Retired Persons 1997). Walters and Hermanson (2001) found that mortgage
borrowers sixty-five years or older were three times more likely to hold a
subprime mortgage than borrowers less than thirty-five years old.
Changes in the supply and the delivery of credit have been important fac-
tors in the growth and segmentation of the subprime industry. Outstanding
asset-backed securities tripled from $33 billion in 1995 to $90 billion 1997
and grew to $286 billion by 2002, for an annual growth rate of 36%
(Immergluck 2004). Much of the lending funded by these securities is
subprime in nature (Canner, Durkin, and Luckett 1998). These securities can
be broken out into higher- and lower-risk segments, which further aids the
ability of high-risk lenders to penetrate various markets and enables lenders
to tolerate higher default and foreclosure rates. Moreover, although a rela-
tively small portion of subprime loans have been directly purchased by Fan-
nie Mae or Freddie Mac, the large government-sponsored secondary market
firms, these companies—especially Freddie Mac—have played a significant
role in facilitating the securitization process by offering credit enhancements
or what is called “wrapping” the securities for easier financing and sale
(Skillern 2000).
Another critical factor in the explosion of subprime lending has been the
growth in the number of independent mortgage brokers during the last ten to
twenty years. From 1991 to 1998, the number of brokers grew at an annual
rate of 14% (Kim-Sung and Hermanson 2003). In 2000, 30,000 mortgage
brokerage firms employed an estimated 240,000 workers and accounted for
approximately 55% of all mortgage originations. Moreover, broker origi-
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nated loans are twice as likely to be subprime than lender-originated loans.
Among older borrowers, brokers are also more likely to lend to divorced,
female, and non-White borrowers. Of older non-White borrowers, 62%
received loans via brokers, whereas only 38% of older White borrowers did.
Brokers are heavily associated with aggressive “push marketing.” Kim-
Sung and Hermanson (2003) found that 56% of older borrowers with
brokered loans reported that contact was initiated by the broker, whereas
other older borrowers reported that lenders initiated contact only 24% of the
time. Borrowers with brokered loans were generally less satisfied with their
loans and were less likely to feel that they received honest information.
Increasing market segmentation has been facilitated by advances in infor-
mation technology that have enabled banks and prime mortgage lenders to
mine sophisticated databases in an effort to identify higher-income segments
of the market (Gale 2001; Immergluck 2004). This plays out by race and
geography, especially for banks, which continue to expand branch operations
in White, affluent neighborhoods (Avery et al. 1997). As banks and prime
mortgage firms compete more furiously for more affluent customers, they
leave the minority and lower-income neighborhoods ripe for penetration by
subprime lenders. And because the marketing and sales efforts of prime lend-
ers are often tied to branch locations and mail solicitations, segmentation
takes on a particularly geographic nature.
The result of these and other forces is that the subprime market is pro-
foundly segmented across race and space. Moreover, the segmentation does
not appear to be substantially accounted for by credit history. In an analysis
of subprime lending in Chicago and Philadelphia, Calem, Gillen, and
Wachter (forthcoming) found that after controlling for education, credit
score, income, and housing stock characteristics, Black neighborhoods still
had much higher levels of subprime lending than White neighborhoods. For
refinance loans, an all-Black neighborhood was expected to have a subprime
share that was 24 percentage points higher than an otherwise equivalent
White neighborhood, even after controlling for the credit history of neigh-
borhood residents. A larger study of ten metropolitan areas found similar
results (NCRC 2003). Even after controlling for housing turnover, age of
housing stock, median income, percentage of residents age sixty-five and
older, and the percent of residents with high-risk credit scores, the percentage
of residents who were Black was a consistently strong determinant of
subprime lending activity.
This dual market can create a sense of futility among minority homeown-
ers in considering banks and other prime lenders as potential sources of mort-
gage credit. Even among borrowers who do have impaired credit, the
subprime market does not appear to be functioning in a way that serves the
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interests of borrowers well. In Fannie Mae’s 2001 National Housing Survey,
only 34% of credit-impaired respondents were confident that they got the
lowest cost mortgage available, as compared to 68% of all homeowners sur-
veyed (Fannie Mae 2001). Moreover, more subprime than prime respondents
reported not knowing anything about their credit rating. With such inefficien-
cies, high default and foreclosure rates may be expected, even higher than
those that might be explained by the average weaker credit histories among
borrowers. Moreover, the spatial concentration of subprime lending is likely
to result in spatial concentrations of high foreclosure levels.
SUBPRIME LOANS AND FORECLOSURES
A number of studies show high foreclosure rates among subprime loans.
Subprime loans appear to lead to delinquency and foreclosure at relatively
high rates, especially within the higher-risk segment of the industry. Sub-
prime lenders may make “A–,” “B,” “C,” or some lower grade of loan, signi-
fying higher risk. (Prime loans are considered “A” grade.) A late 1990s
industry survey of 27 larger subprime lenders indicated that ninety-day
delinquency rates for C- and D-grade loans were 10% and 22%, respectively,
compared to a rate of 0.25% for prime refinance loans (Phillips-Patrick et al.
2000). Even FHA loans, which have been persistently tied to foreclosure and
property abandonment problems in minority communities, had ninety-day
delinquency rates of less than 2% for refinance loans during the same period.
The foreclosure rate for all subprime loans in this sample (including the 55%
that were A– grade) was more than four times the FHA rate. The foreclosure
rate for C and D loans is expected to be much higher. In this voluntary survey,
almost 20% of subprime loans were C and D grade. However, the source
of these data appears to be biased toward substantially underepresenting
higher-risk loans. Even more concerning is the fact that problems among
subprime loans worsened considerably beginning in 2000 (Crews-Cutts and
Van Order 2003). Rates of serious delinquency for subprime loans (of all
grades) increased from less than 5% in early 2000 to more than 8% by late
2001. Prime loan delinquencies were almost constant during this period, at
around 1%, and FHA delinquencies rose much more slowly from about 3.5%
to about 4.5%.
Because subprime lending—especially the higher-risk segments known
as B, C or D lending—is highly concentrated in certain types of neighbor-
hoods, these neighborhoods are likely to bear a disproportionate share of
subprime foreclosures. Foreclosures—particularly those leading to aban-
donment and blight—can have negative spillover effects, or externalities,
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that can be a key source of market failure. Because the negative social costs of
these spatially concentrated foreclosures (abandonment, blight, and lower
neighborhood property values) are not captured in market transactions, the
high foreclosure numbers suggest that lending levels may be excessive even
from an efficiency perspective. Moreover, foreclosures in struggling, low- or
moderate-income, and minority neighborhoods might be expected to have
more negative effects than those in middle- and upper-income areas. In the
latter case, the foreclosures are less likely to lead to abandoned buildings and
neighborhood blight.
SUBPRIME LENDING AND FORECLOSURES IN URBAN AREAS
At least eight recent studies have identified some relationship between
subprime lending and foreclosures at the neighborhood level (Burnett, Her-
bert, and Kaul 2002; Collins 2003; Gruenstein and Herbert 2000a, 2000b;
National Training and Information Center 1999; Newman and Wyly 2004;
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2000; Zimmerman,
Wyly, and Botein 2002). In Baltimore, for example, while the subprime share
of mortgages in the city was 21% in 1998 (presumably higher than in previ-
ous years), 45% of foreclosure petitions in that year were tied to subprime
loans (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2000). Sub-
prime foreclosures accounted for 57% of all foreclosures in Black Baltimore
neighborhoods. In Atlanta, Abt and Associates found that foreclosures
attributed to subprime lenders accounted for 36% of all foreclosures in
predominantly minority neighborhoods in 1999, whereas their share of loan
originations was between 26% and 31% in the preceding three years
(Gruenstein and Herbert 2000a). In Essex County, New Jersey, researchers
found that the percentage of foreclosures attributed to subprime lenders
increased from 19% in 1995 to 30% in 2000, although they also admitted that
these figures substantially underestimated the subprime share of foreclosures
(Zimmerman, Wyly, and Botein 2002). By mapping foreclosures, they were
also able to identify that foreclosures were disproportionately concentrated
in predominantly Black neighborhoods.
These studies generally tend to underestimate the proportion of foreclo-
sures due to subprime originators and overestimate the proportion due to
prime originators. Many subprime loans are sold to financial institutions
identified by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development as
“prime” lenders or are held in trusts at prime lending institutions (usually
banks). Thus, foreclosures of subprime loans sold to prime lenders or trusts
would list only the prime lender who currently holds the loan, not the origi-
nating subprime lender. The reverse does not tend to be the case. That is,
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subprime lenders do not often buy loans from prime lenders and generally do
not have trust capacity.
In the previous studies of Chicago foreclosures, the authors were plagued
by the same problem but did obtain pricing data on a portion of the foreclo-
sures. The National Training and Information Center (1999) found that fore-
closures on loans with interest rates above comparable treasury rates plus
four percentage points (clearly subprime-priced loans) increased by 500%
from 1993 to 1998. Collins (2003) found that loans by subprime lenders
increased by 32% from 1996 to 2001, while foreclosures on loans priced 300
basis points or higher increased by 260% during the same period.
A BETTER MEASURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SUBPRIME LENDING AND FORECLOSURES
Subprime loans are expected to entail at least marginally higher risks than
prime loans, so somewhat higher foreclosure rates are expected. At the heart
of many policy debates regarding subprime and predatory lending, however,
is a question of how much additional risk should be tolerated. To inform this
debate, better measures are needed of the effect that subprime loans of vari-
ous types (home purchase vs. refinance, for example) have on neighborhood
foreclosure levels. To do this, we acquired computerized foreclosure data for
the five-county metropolitan Chicago area, geocoded it to the Census tract
level, and compared it to lending data in the same area.1
We geocoded and analyzed foreclosure data from 1995 and 2002. Rather
than completed foreclosures, these data represent foreclosure starts.2 In
many ways, this is a superior indicator of homeowner distress than com-
pleted foreclosures. Moreover, because property may be lost through offer-
ing deed in lieu of foreclosure, the number of completed foreclosures may
underestimate the loss of homes due to loan distress. We also aggregated
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data in various ways for the years
1996 through 2001. Most important, conventional mortgages were defined
as prime or subprime based on characteristics of the originating lender.
Although HMDA data do not capture all mortgages, they capture a large seg-
ment of the mortgage market.3
Before developing some relatively precise measures of the relationship
between subprime lending and foreclosures, we first examine the broader
patterns of the foreclosures. From 1995 to 2002, the Chicago area experi-
enced tremendous growth in foreclosure starts (the initial filings of foreclo-
sure notices). The total number of starts went from 7,433 in 1995 to 25,145 in
2002, an increase of 238%. A disproportionate segment of this increase was
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due to conventional loans, which are merely those loans not guaranteed by
the federal government (including the Federal Housing Administration or the
Veterans Administration). Historically, FHA loans, which account for the
bulk of government-guaranteed loans, have had substantially higher foreclo-
sure rates than conventional loans and have accounted for a very large and
disproportionate share of foreclosures. Of course, as subprime loans (which
comprise a portion of conventional loans) increased, conventional loan fore-
closure rates would be expected to increase to some degree. However, the
nature of urban foreclosure problems has been fundamentally transformed
during the mid-to-late 1990s and into the new century. It is now the
conventional mortgage market that accounts for the bulk of foreclosures.
Although government-guaranteed foreclosures in the Chicago area rose
significantly during this period, from 3,387 to 6,932, conventional foreclo-
sures skyrocketed from 4,046 to 18,213. The conventional foreclosures
increased at a rate (350%) more than three times the government-guaranteed
rate (105%). As a result, although conventional loans accounted for only
slightly more than half of foreclosures in 1995, they accounted for almost
three out of four just seven years later.
FORECLOSURES AND NEIGHBORHOOD
RACIAL COMPOSITION
It is well established that subprime lending increased much more in
minority than nonminority neighborhoods in the 1990s (Immergluck 2004).
Moreover, individual lenders may experience large spatial variations in loan
performance within a metropolitan area. These two phenomena suggest that
one might expect disproportionate increases in subprime foreclosures in
minority neighborhoods.
In fact, Figure 1 shows that there were large differences in the growth of
foreclosures by neighborhood racial and ethnic composition from 1995 to
2002 in the five-county Chicago area. Whereas conventional foreclosures
increased dramatically in all neighborhood types, they increased consider-
ably faster in neighborhoods with larger minority populations. Neighbor-
hoods with minority populations of less than 10% in 2000 saw an increase in
foreclosures of 215%, and neighborhoods with 90% or greater minority pop-
ulations experienced an increase of 544%. Neighborhoods with 90% or more
minority residents in 2000 accounted for 40% of the 1995–2002 increase in
conventional foreclosures.4 These same tracts represent only 9.2% of the
owner-occupied housing units in the region. Tracts with 50% or greater
minority populations accounted for more than 61% of the increase in
conventional foreclosures.
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Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the pattern of increased foreclosures across the
metropolitan area. Although foreclosures increased everywhere, these fig-
ures show the concentration of the increase on the city’s west and south sides,
as well as in suburban communities with significant minority populations
such as parts of southern and western Cook County; Elgin and Aurora in
northeast and southeast Kane County, respectively; Waukegan and North
Chicago in eastern Lake County; and Joliet in west central Will County.
Figure 4 plots the number of foreclosures in 2002 divided by the number
of all types of conventional loans (home purchase, refinance, and home
improvement loans) made between 1996 and 2001. The loans in the six years
preceding 2002 are expected to be a substantial source of foreclosures in
2002. The more loans in a neighborhood, other things equal, the more fore-
closures one would expect. Figure 4 shows that neighborhoods on the city’s
west and south sides, as well as in large parts of southern Cook County, had
high foreclosure levels even when compared to preceding lending levels. In
addition, pockets of high foreclosure activity are present in older, outer sub-
urban communities with significant minority populations such as Elgin,
Waukegan, and Joliet.
ANALYZING THE LINK BETWEEN
SUBPRIME LENDING AND FORECLOSURES
The availability of comprehensive foreclosure filing data at a neighbor-
hood level allows us to relate subprime lending flows to increases in foreclo-
sures. We have a prior expectation that neighborhoods in which a higher
share of home loans are made by subprime lenders during the 1996 to 2001
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period would have higher increases in foreclosures from 1995 to 2002. We
also expect, other things equal, that neighborhoods with larger numbers of
prime loans would also have larger raw increases in foreclosures, although
we expect the effect to be smaller than for subprime loans. Besides the level
of subprime and prime lending, other factors that might be expected to affect
foreclosure rates include the neighborhood unemployment rate and any
change in unemployment, median income and change in income, population
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and change in population, and median home value and change in value. The
theoretical rationale for including racial or ethnic variables in a model for
determining foreclosure rates is contestable. However, some observers may
argue that without controlling for race and ethnicity, any effect of subprime
lending on foreclosures is partly due to the repayment behavior of minority
households. Therefore, we incorporate race and ethnicity variables to pro-
vide a conservative measure of the effect of subprime lending on foreclo-
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sures—after controlling for neighborhood race and ethnicity.5 We also
incorporate variables indicating changes in racial and ethnic composition.
To better understand the sorts of loans that are contributing to large fore-
closure increases, we also break out the loans by purpose. This also allows us
to compare the effect of subprime prime lending on foreclosures while con-
trolling for loan purpose. This is important because the purposes of subprime
loans tend to be quite different from those of prime loans. For example, the
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portion of subprime loans that are refinance loans tends to be higher, at least
in higher interest rate environments, than is the case for prime loans. The
composition of prime loans is much more sensitive to interest rates because
low rates have a strong positive effect on prime refinancings.
To measure the effect of different neighborhood-level factors on the num-
ber of foreclosures in the neighborhood in 2002, we begin with the following
basic model:
F2002 = F1995 + OOPHP1996–2001 + OOSHP1996–2001 + OOPHI1996–2001
+ OOSHI1996–2001 + OOPREF1996–2001 + OOSREF1996–2001
+ NOOPL1996–2001 + NOOSL1996–2001 + Zj1990+ ∆Zj 1990/2000
(1)
Variables are defined as follows:
F2002 is the number of foreclosures in the tract in 2002, the ending year.
F1995 is the number of foreclosures in the tract in 1995, the initial year.
OOHP1996–2001 is the number of owner-occupied prime home purchase loans
made in the intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
OOSHP1996–2001 is the number of owner-occupied subprime home purchase loans
made in the intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
OOHI1996–2001 is the number of owner-occupied prime home improvement loans
made in the intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
OOSHI1996–2001 is the number of owner-occupied subprime home improvement
loans made in the intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
OOPREF1996–2001 is the number of owner-occupied prime refinance loans made
in the intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
OOSREF1996–2001 is the number of owner-occupied subprime refinance loans
made in the intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
NOOPL1996–2001 is the number of non-owner-occupied prime loans made in the
intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
NOOSL1996–2001 is the number of non-owner-occupied subprime loans made in
the intervening period, 1996 to 2001.
Zj1990 is a set of other independent variables providing important characteristics of
the neighborhood derived from 1990 Census data, including the unemploy-
ment rate, population, median home value, median income, percentage Black
and Hispanic.
∆Zj1990/2000 is a set of independent variables indicating changes in the Z variables
from 1990 to 2000, again from Census data.
Table 1 gives summary statistics, including mean and standard deviation,
for each of the independent variables as well as the dependent variable, F2002.
It also provides the simple Pearson correlation coefficient between each in-
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dependent variable and the dependent variable. Notice that, as one might ex-
pect, there is a substantial correlation between the initial and ending levels of
foreclosures. However, there is an even stronger correlation between 2002
foreclosures and the number of owner-occupied subprime home purchase,
refinance, and home improvement loans (from .660 to .888) and non-owner-
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics and Correlations with Dependent Variable for
Regressions Explaining 2002 Foreclosure Levels
Correlation versus
Conventional
M SD Foreclosures 2002
Conventional foreclosures, 2002a 11.39 12.55 1.000
Conventional foreclosures, 1995a 2.55 2.55 0.597**
OO prime conventional home purchase loans,
1996–2001 341.65 456.26 0.138**
OO subprime conventional home purchase loans,
1996–2001 24.79 23.84 0.660**
OO prime conventional home improvement loans,
1996–2001 84.07 67.11 0.489**
OO subprime conventional home improvement
loans, 1996–2001 12.51 15.73 0.864**
OO prime conventional refinance loans,
1996–2001 446.08 483.01 0.169**
OO subprime conventional refinance loans,
1996–2001 77.17 72.75 0.888**
NOO prime loans, 1996–2001 36.02 36.15 0.287**
NOO subprime loans, 1996–2001 7.84 11.26 0.719**
Unemployment rate, 1990 (%) 5.48 4.41 0.188**
Change in unemployment rate (%) –0.52 3.47 –0.001
Population, 1990 4,325.11 2,371.96 0.404**
Change in population (%) 12.20 79.55 0.026
Median home value, 1990 $113,700 $79,424 –0.249**
Change in median home valueb (%) 76.21 92.23 –0.168**
Median family income, 1989 $41,231 $19,638 –0.091**
Change in median family incomeb (%) 51.68 76.94 –0.122**
% Black, 1990 24.44 37.44 0.362**
Change in % Black 1.72 7.97 0.269**
% Hispanic, 1990 12.69 20.34 –0.206**
Change in % Hispanic 5.27 11.80 –0.036*
NOTE: N = 1,578. OO = owner-occupied; NOO = non-owner-occupied.
a. Conventional means all foreclosures on non-government-guaranteed loans. Foreclosures of
unknown type (conventional vs. government guaranteed) were allocated to the conventional cat-
egory based on the distribution of known government and conventional foreclosures in the tract.
b. Nominal changes, not adjusted for inflation.
* = significant at .05 to .10. ** = significant at less than .01.
 at GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIV LIB on June 11, 2013uar.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
occupied subprime loans (.719). Prime lending activity is also positively re-
lated to the extent of foreclosures. Again, this is somewhat expected because
foreclosures occur on loans. That is, you cannot have a foreclosure unless
you have a loan. Moreover, both loans and foreclosures are related to
the number of mortgageable properties in an area. The simple correlations
between 2002 foreclosures and the other independent variables are not
very strong, although many are statistically significant, and generally with
expected signs, including median family income (negative), race (positive),
and ethnicity (negative).
Table 2 presents the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of
partial and full model estimations of Equation 1. The left-hand portion of the
table presents the results when the lending data are excluded. The right-hand
portion presents the results of the estimation of the full model. The left-hand
columns show that, without regressing on the lending data, a number of
demographic characteristics appear to have significant impacts on foreclo-
sures, including percentage Black (positive), change in percentage Black
(positive), median property value (negative), and median family income
(positive). For example, going from a tract that saw no change in percentage
Black from 1990 to 2000 to one that saw its Black population increase by
10%, other things equal in the restricted model, would result in 3.6 more fore-
closures in 2002, a significant amount compared to the average of 11.39 fore-
closures. However, this model omits any information on lending volume or
type of lending. Note that in this model, the coefficient estimate for popula-
tion is positive because population is essentially proxying for the number of
homes, which in turn limits the number of loans that may be go into foreclo-
sure.
The full model incorporates both the volume and type of lending occur-
ring in the neighborhood in the intervening period. Consistent with intuition,
the regression results show that tracts with larger numbers of prime home
purchase and prime home improvement loans do have somewhat higher fore-
closure levels, other things equal. With home purchase loans, for example, as
more people buy homes in an area and turnover rates increase, one would
expect, other things equal, to see foreclosure rates increase. Long-time resi-
dents of the neighborhood have lower loan-to-value ratios and may have even
paid off their homes.
The results in Table 2 show that the volume and type of mortgage lending
are crucial determinants of foreclosure activity and affect the coefficients on
the demographic variables. After the lending variables are added into the
model, the adjusted R2 increases from .599 to .867, suggesting a substantial
increase in explanatory power. Moreover, the coefficients on the demo-
graphic variables are generally reduced, so that some of them are no longer
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significant and others have significantly smaller magnitudes. (For two vari-
ables, unemployment rate and percentage Hispanic, the coefficient estimates
become statistically significant.) In particular, the coefficient on the change
in the percentage Black variable is reduced by approximately two-thirds, to
.122. Thus, using the full model, going from a neighborhood that saw no
increase in percentage Black to one that saw a 10% increase, other things
being equal, is expected to increase 2002 foreclosures by only about 1.2 fore-
closures rather than 3.6, reducing the effect of racial change on foreclosures
by two-thirds. Importantly, the 1990 percentage Black variable now becomes
insignificant. Thus, the OLS results, at least, suggest that higher foreclosure
rates in Black neighborhoods are generally explained by higher subprime
lending activity. It is interesting to note, however, that the coefficient on the
1990 percentage Hispanic variable goes from being positive and insignifi-
cant to negative and significant, so that Hispanic neighborhoods, other things
equal, are expected to have lower foreclosure levels even compared to
otherwise similar White neighborhoods.
The results in Table 2 also reveal that the propensity for subprime loans of
the same purpose to result in foreclosures is many orders of magnitude
greater than is the case for prime loans. In the case of home purchase loans,
the subprime coefficient is more than 28 times as large as the prime coeffi-
cient. Whereas a tract with 100 additional prime home purchase loans from
1996 to 2001, other things equal, is expected to have only 0.3 additional fore-
closures in 2002, a tract with 100 more subprime home purchase loans is
expected to have 8.9 additional foreclosures. When looking at home improve-
ment loans, a tract with 100 more subprime loans, other things equal, is
expected to have an additional 9.5 foreclosures in 2002, and the correspond-
ing effect for refinance loans is 7.8. Even though most research to this point
has focused on the refinance market, these figures suggest that the effect of
subprime home purchase loans is similar to that in the refinance market.
However, even though the per-loan foreclosure effects are similar,
because there are so many more subprime refinance loans than home pur-
chase or improvement loans, the subprime refinances contribute much more
in the aggregate to foreclosures. A standard deviation increase in owner-
occupied subprime refinance loans is expected to result in a .453 standard
deviation increase in 2002 foreclosures, or about 5.7 foreclosures. A stan-
dard deviation increase in subprime home purchase loans, by contrast, is
expected to result in an increase of about 2.1 foreclosures, whereas a standard
deviation increase in subprime home improvement loans is expected to result
in 1.5 foreclosures.
In the case of refinance loans, the number of owner-occupied prime loans
is actually expected to lead to somewhat lower foreclosure levels. A tract
380 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / January 2005
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with 100 more owner-occupied prime refinance loans during the 1996 to
2001 period, other things being equal, is expected to have 0.55 fewer foreclo-
sures in 2002. The standardized coefficient is substantial at –.209, so that a
standard-deviation higher level of prime refinance loans corresponds to 2.6
fewer foreclosures in 2002. This finding, combined with the large standard-
ized coefficient on owner-occupied subprime refinance loans (.453), might
be explained by a substitution effect between prime and subprime refinance
loans. That is, as prime loans increase, the potential market for subprime
lenders may be diminished, crowding out such lenders. This hypothesis is
consistent with the evidence that substantial numbers of subprime loans go to
borrowers worthy of prime loans as well as the related research showing that
credit scores do not explain the very high rates of subprime lending in minor-
ity neighborhoods (Freddie Mac 1996; Phillips-Patrick et al. 2000; Calem,
Gillen, and Wachter, forthcoming; NCRC 2003).
AN ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION
Because foreclosure data are nonnegative count data and because there is
a significant, albeit relatively small, number of tracts (6%) with zero foreclo-
sures, the data are not normally distributed, so ordinary least squares is not
ideally suited for estimating Equation 1 or its variations. Typically, the most
appropriate methods for modeling count data, where one seeks to model the
number of occurrences of an event of interest as a function of some independ-
ent variables, are either Poisson or negative binomial regression techniques.
Poisson regression is not appropriate in this case because the data are
overdispersed. That is, the variance of the dependent variable significantly
exceeds the mean. (Additional diagnostics not shown here also confirm that
the Poisson technique is not appropriate.) Negative binomial regression is
appropriate for this case, however. The disadvantage of negative binomial
estimation is that the interpretation of the coefficients is less straightforward
than that of OLS, and the results are not easily translated into raw number
effects because negative binomial coefficients yield proportional effects.
Moreover, because the results do not relate a raw change in loan volume to a
raw change in foreclosures, the method is less intuitively appealing.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the method, Table 3 gives the results of
a negative binomial estimation of the relationship in Equation 1. As in Table
2, the left-hand portion of the table gives results for a limited model in which
lending variables are omitted. Again, in most cases, the effect of adding the
lending variables is to reduce the magnitude of the coefficient estimates of
the demographic variables.
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In negative binomial regression, one way to interpret the results is to rec-
ognize that the exponentiated coefficients are the proportional increase in the
expected value of the dependent variable due to a one-unit increase in the
independent variable. For example, in the results of the full model, an
increase of one subprime home purchase loan from 1996 to 2001 is expected
to result in 0.6223% more foreclosures in 2002. Although it is difficult to
compare the magnitudes of the OLS and negative binomial coefficient esti-
mates, the results of Tables 2 and 3 are generally consistent. More variables
are statistically significant in Table 3 than in Table 2. However, eleven of the
seventeen variables have the same sign. Of the six variables that have coeffi-
cients with different signs in the two regressions, only two are statistically
significant in both results. One notable difference in the results is that the neg-
ative binomial results show that both the 1990 percentage Black and the
change in percentage Black variables have a positive and significant effect on
foreclosures, even after controlling for subprime lending activity. The 1990
percentage Black variable did not remain significant in the OLS results in
Table 2.
More important, both the OLS and negative binomial regression results
suggest that an increase in subprime lending—with some inconsistency in
the results for home improvement loans—has a very substantial, positive
effect on foreclosures, whereas prime lending has very modest effects. In the
case of home purchase lending, a tract with 100 more subprime loans in the
1996 to 2001 period, other things equal, corresponds to 85.96% more fore-
closures in 2002.6 Conversely, a tract with 100 more prime home purchase
loans, other things equal, corresponds to 2.45% fewer foreclosures. In the
OLS results from Table 2, the difference in magnitudes of the subprime and
prime effects was similar (a factor of twenty-eight), although the sign of the
effect in Table 2 is positive. Thus, the effect of subprime home purchase loans
on foreclosures is consistently positive and very large, whereas the effect of
prime home purchase loans is consistently small but of ambiguous sign.
In the case of refinance loans, the negative binomial results are also gener-
ally consistent with the OLS results. In the OLS results, prime refinance
loans had a small negative effect on foreclosures. In the results in Table 3, the
effect is positive but very small and not significant. In both cases, the effect of
subprime refinance loans on foreclosures is positive, statistically significant,
and of substantial magnitude. From Table 3, 100 additional prime home
improvement loans in a tract during the 1996 to 2001 period are associated,
other things equal, with 16.3% more foreclosures in 2002. As was the case in
interpreting the OLS results, it is important to keep in mind the larger varia-
tion in subprime refinance lending across tracts. The standard deviation in
subprime refinance loans is more than three times the standard deviation in
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subprime home purchase loans (73 vs. 24) and more than four times the stan-
dard deviation in subprime home improvement loans (73 vs. 16).
In the case of home improvement loans, the effect of prime home
improvement loans on foreclosures is positive and statistically significant in
both regressions. However, whereas the OLS results suggest that subprime
home improvement loans have a substantially larger, positive impact on fore-
closures as compared to prime home improvement loans, the negative bino-
mial results do not. The coefficient on subprime home improvement loans in
Table 3 is actually negative, though very small and not statistically signifi-
cant. Moreover, in the results in Table 3, prime home improvement loans
have a relatively substantial, positive effect on foreclosures, which is not
expected. A 100 additional prime home improvement loans is associated,
other things equal, with a 32.2% increase in foreclosures. We should point
out here that the HMDA significantly undercounts loans made for home
improvement purposes because it does not require lenders to report most
open-ended home equity lines of credit. Because lines of credit borrowers are
likely to be disproportionately prime borrowers, this could be a source of
omitted variable bias. Tracts with more “prime” closed-end home improve-
ment loans (as reported under the HMDA) might actually receive fewer
open-ended home equity loans because of a substitution between the two
types of loans. This problem is complicated by the fact that some lenders
identified by HUD as “prime” make significant numbers of subprime loans.
For example, it may be that many “prime” lenders are serving substantial
numbers of subprime borrowers via closed-end home improvement loans
while serving prime borrowers more through open-ended home equity loans
that are generally not reported to the HMDA.
RECOGNIZING THE COSTS
OF CONCENTRATED FORECLOSURES
The findings of this study indicate that subprime lending is a very strong
determinant of neighborhood foreclosure levels. Responsible subprime lend-
ing may indeed bring important benefits to families that have difficulty
obtaining credit elsewhere. However, the results here show that after control-
ling for neighborhood demographics and economic conditions, subprime
loans lead to foreclosures at far greater rates than do prime loans.
Prime lending, on the other hand, has minimal impact on the foreclosure
level, at least in the case of home purchase and refinance lending. If anything,
this analysis is likely to underestimate the impact of subprime lending on
neighborhood foreclosures in neighborhoods that are particularly vulnera-
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ble. Residents of lower-income and minority communities are less likely to
be able to avoid foreclosure via borrowing from friends and relatives or by
increasing working hours. Interactions between subprime lending and neigh-
borhood demographic variables are possible. Unfortunately, the data set used
here is not robust enough to test for such interdependencies. This is certainly
an important area for further research.
This study has a number of implications for regulatory policy in the arena
of home lending. First, it makes a strong case that the magnitude of the effect
of subprime lending on neighborhood foreclosures is very large. It suggests,
for example, that subprime lending explains roughly two-thirds of the greater
levels of foreclosures in neighborhoods undergoing greater racial change
(greater increases in percentage Black). Given the impact of foreclosures on
neighborhood vitality and stability, especially in modest-income neighbor-
hoods where foreclosures more often lead to abandonment and blight, this
cost of high-risk lending should be given more weight in policy discussions.
This is especially true because much of this cost is borne by entire communi-
ties, not just by the lender or borrower.
Foes of increased regulation of the subprime mortgage market often argue
that increased regulation will result in higher costs of borrowing for many
borrowers and perhaps even reduce credit access for some. However, the
social costs involved in substantially higher foreclosures in many struggling
neighborhoods might not be easily outweighed by marginally lower borrow-
ing costs spread thinly across a broad set of borrowers. Even if some worthy
borrowers are prevented from obtaining credit because of increased regula-
tion, the benefits of reduced foreclosures may justify such action. Moreover,
foreclosures are hardly the entire costs of overly risky and irresponsible
subprime lending. Financial and emotional stress, excessive charges and
fees, and other harms to borrowers must be considered. Certainly, many bor-
rowers benefit from responsible subprime lending. The findings of this study,
however, suggest that the negative spillovers occurring in the existing mar-
ketplace are substantial and that such spillovers must be more clearly consid-
ered in policy making.
NOTES
1. This includes Cook, DuPage, Lake, Kane, and Will Counties. These are the counties for
which complete foreclosure data were available from the firm; foreclosure report of Chicago
complete data were not available for McHenry County, the “sixth” county in the traditional six-
county metropolitan definition. For each year, the foreclosure data were cleaned by removing
certain multiple foreclosure entries at the same address during a very short period of time. For a
number of foreclosure records, especially for those in DuPage, Kane, and Lake Counties in 2002,
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there were no recorded property types (i.e., single family, multifamily, commercial). In Cook and
Will Counties, where the vast majority of property types were known, the unknown property
types were estimated based on the distribution of known properties. For DuPage, Kane, and Lake
Counties, it was assumed that the vast majority of properties were single-family dwellings based
on the data from 1995, where property type information was available. For these counties, a small
percentage of foreclosures (typically less than 1%) were allotted as nonsingle family. Foreclo-
sure data is available only at the individual property level. Each record had to be geocoded to
determine its census tract. For each year, roughly 98% of addresses were able to be geocoded.
The remaining 2% had addresses that could not be found.
2. Collins (2003) found that 36% of foreclosures starts resulted in completed foreclosures
in 2001. He also found the completed portion to be higher in a sample of lower-income
neighborhoods.
3. The largest incomplete segment in the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) is the
home equity loan market. Home equity loans that are used for home improvement may be
reported to the HMDA, but not necessarily. Moreover, other home equity loans are generally not
reported under the HMDA. The bulk of home purchase loans and a large majority of refinance
loans are reported under the HMDA, however. Lenders are identified as specializing in subprime
loans by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Some “prime” lenders do
originate some subprime loans and visa versa. Although classifying loans by originating lender
rather than loan characteristics has some limitations, it is a reasonable method of measuring
subprime versus prime loan shares in the analysis below.
4. The HMDA data used in this study are reported according to 1990 Census tract boundaries.
Therefore, it was necessary to obtain 2000 Census data recalculated to 1990 tract boundaries for
the purposes of matching the data with the 1990 boundaries. This data was procured from PCI
Services, Inc., which provides this product for its CRA Wiz product, a commonly used loan anal-
ysis software used by federal bank regulators and banks.
5. Controlling more directly for the race and ethnicity of borrowers would be another way of
measuring individual demographic effects on foreclosure. However, the substantial under-
reporting of race and ethnicity data in HMDA data makes this impractical, especially at the
neighborhood level.
6. To determine the impact of 100 loans on foreclosures, we multiply the coefficient by 100
and then exponentiate it. Conversely, one can compound the impact of an increase of one loan
(the exponentiated value of the coefficient) 100 times.
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